Josep E. Rubio, «Raymond Lulle: le langage et la raison. Une introduction à la genèse de l’Ars», «Conférences Pierre Abélard», París, Vrin, 2017, 140 pp. by Hughes, Robert
Ressenyes
Caplletra 66 (Primavera, 2019), p. 249-256. ISSN 0214-8188, ISSN versió electrònica 2386-7159
DOI: 10.7203/Caplletra.66.13514
Josep E. Rubio, Raymond Lulle: le langage et la raison. Une introduction à 
la genèse de l’Ars, «Conférences Pierre Abélard», Paris, Vrin, 2017, 140 p., ISBN: 
978-2-7116-2714-1.
The book under review consists of four chapters, each divided into subsec-
tions, chapters preceded by a list of abbreviations pertinent to Ramon Llull’s oeuvre, 
together with a brief preface, and is followed by a short bibliography and a table of 
contents. The chapters, respectively offer insights into: 1) The problematic relation 
between language and reality in Llull; 2) Reality as a sign and how the interplay of 
significations within Lullian epistemology finds itself formalised within the Lullian 
Art; 3) Contemplative reason/rational contemplation in the Ars demonstrativa (c. 1283; 
hereafter AD); and 4) The new «common language» of the Art as found in the Intro-
ductoria Artis demonstrativae (1283-85 ?; hereafter Introd AD), of which, for reasons of 
brevity, only certain elements are discussed below.1
In the preface to this book, written as its title suggests in (excellent) French, 
this Valencian author presents the philosophy of language as the starting point for 
Llull’s reflections upon the relations between reality, reason and linguistic expression. 
Josep E. Rubio asserts that such reflection, for Llull, served as the basis of the latter’s 
«discovery» of the Art in response to the expressive challenges posed specifically by 
his vast early work, the Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-74 (?); hereafter LC) 
(p. 9). In order to contextualise this project, Rubio poses the question of how Llull’s 
semiotic theory compares to the ideas under dispute within the philosophy of lan-
guage during the period in which he was writing (p. 9-10; Ch. 1 passim). The explicit 
aim of Rubio’s book is to present the underlying presuppositions of Llull’s method 
of discovering the truth, i.e. his ars inveniendi veritatem or Art (p. 10), rather than to 
1. For an admirably succinct summary of the set of (six) interlinked points constituting a large part of 
the overall thesis of this book, the reader should consult p. 113-114 therein.
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give a detailed account thereof (as has already been done elsewhere by himself and 
others), and, moreover, subsequently to demonstrate that this «Art of finding truth» 
is itself based upon Llull’s understanding —as well as methods— of contemplation: 
«La contemplation et la prière sont le fondement de l’art de trouver la vérité» (p. 111). 
In terms of Lullian scholarship, the use of a lens such as semiotics and the 
philosophy of language, whereby to focus upon, not least, processes of analogy and 
signification, though not entirely novel, remains a particularly apt approach to the 
study of certain medieval authors and, in particular, Ramon Llull. Previous authors 
in the field, such as Jordi Gayà, Mark D. Johnston and Joan Tusquets (all referenced 
by Rubio), to name but a few, have applied this kind of principle to good effect. It 
ought to be commented, nonetheless, that Rubio here has achieved particularly 
wide-ranging and productive results from the implementation of such a procedure, 
ably linking, through an analysis of the use of the key concepts of similitude and sig-
nification employed in Lullian «hermeneutics» (modern hermeneutics, at least, itself 
being a field which includes the study of both semiotics and presuppositions), the 
contemplative with the demonstrative dimensions of Llull’s Art (p. 63ff. and passim). 
He thereby illustrates how Lullian semiotics exists for the sake of his epistemology 
(p. 23) and how hermeneutics serves as the basis of his heuresis or inventio (p. 53; 62-63).
In illustration of these latter points, we find useful and novel discussion (p. 30-
67) of the various ways in which Llull confronts the limitations faced by (and inherent 
to): a) sensible significations (p. 30); b) the sensible nature of the sign (p. 45) and, 
therefore, sensible linguistic expression in general (including affatus, a Lullian «sixth 
sense», for which see below) (p. 50); as well as by (and to) c) intellectual or spiritual 
knowledge itself (p. 63ff.). In the first two cases, such limitations consist in the possi-
ble occurrence of false significations and falsehoods or lies (p. 50), while, in the latter 
case, it is a question of the substance (or essence) of an object’s being inaccessible to 
intellectual knowledge (p. 64). With respect to case a), recourse to intellectual signifi-
cations provides a solution (p. 30). In case b), the Lullian correlatives (i.e. the dynamic 
and ternary unfolding of his onto-theo-logical principles) supercharge language and, 
in combination with the concept of translatio/transumptio (as employed by Llull), 
transcend the above limits regarding the expression of divine reality.2 In case c), on the 
other hand, apperception (one of Llull’s five «spiritual senses») —though here Rubio 
fails to note the importance of cogitació, likewise a spiritual sense— offers a partial 
2. In addition, here, affatus (as I understand it, oral rather than merely verbal expression à la Rubio, 
p. 45) represents an attempt on Llull’s part, in Rubio’s view, to reduce the gap between sensible linguistic ex-
pression and intellectual thought (p. 46).
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response thereto, as do similitudes, which, along with faith (p. 10; 51), the correct 
moral disposition of the Artist (p. 98-103; 108; 110; 118) and the mystical components 
of Llull’s thought (p. 71; 92ff.; 114), all help to transcend such limits, the former by 
facilitating relative comparisons (via the principles of Figure T) (p. 67).3
As has at times been my own practice, Rubio employs what can only be called 
a «broad definition» of Llull’s Art or Arts, namely, he subsumes both what, after the 
periodisations carried out by Anthony Bonner, has conventionally been called the 
«post-Art phase» of Lullian production (1308-1315) and what is known as the «pre-
Art phase» (1271-74) under the general heading of the «Lullian Art(s)». He employs 
such on the understanding that both the former and the latter are so imbued with 
the characteristics of the «Art proper» (i.e., the Arts of the «Quaternary» and the 
«Ternary» phases dating from 1274-89 and 1290-1308, respectively), albeit in the latter 
case (i.e. particularly in LC) forming less of an organic ensemble, as to be in many 
respects indistinguishable therefrom (p. 54-63). In so doing, he is apt to stress the 
unity and continuity of Llull’s Arts over and against any interpretations which might 
underemphasise these aspects or indeed stress a «ruptural» view (my term) of the shift 
from quaternary to ternary versions thereof (p. 56; 58).
Rubio boldly and explicitly states that the Art begins with LC (p. 54), though 
elucidates further, in his characterisation of the «Pre-Art phase», that this work in 
particular represents a «condensation in nuce» of Llull’s subsequent oeuvre, rather 
than a preliminary stage prior to the Art or more generally to Llull’s entire literary 
production (p. 59). It is on the above basis, then, that Rubio defines the essence of 
the Art in contemplative terms, that is to say, as the structured and systematic con-
templation of the significations offered by the principles within the figures of the Art 
(p. 85), the (early) Art(s) thus consisting in a formalisation of contemplative praxis 
(p. 78). He also maintains that such a contemplative base persists throughout the 
subsequent evolution of the Art. The foregoing procedures, of course, operate in the 
service of the broader and primary goal of the expression and demonstration of the 
Christian articles of faith within an apologetic context (p. 85-86). However, in defining 
the Art in contemplative terms and contemplation in Artistic terms, that is to say, 
by defining each in terms of the other, Rubio risks producing a circular definition, 
unless one considers the two terms separately as signifying two different procedures, 
3. It is in the context of the moral/psychological aspects of the early Arts that Rubio stresses the lasting 
significance of the almost omnipresent and complementary compartments [EAVY] [IVZ] therein, these com-
partments being indicated as the necessary investigative operations to be undertaken by the Artist (p. 101ff.).
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each capable of shedding light upon the other, a separation which presumably the 
author would seek to avoid.
 Nevertheless, through careful and thorough analysis of Ramon Llull’s recourse 
to the semiotic and epistemological roles played by similitude and the interplay of 
significations within the real (i.e. the realms of both the sensible and the intelligible) 
as this latter is perceived hermeneutically by the human intellective soul during 
contemplation, a process strikingly evident in LC (cf. esp. p. 63-69), Rubio is able 
to demonstrate the manner in which all beings can signify all others by virtue of 
their mutual similitude. Such mutual signification takes place according to a logic 
of analogy aimed at facilitating knowledge as well as guaranteeing the truth of the 
Artist’s discoveries concerning God, who is defined as and through (and contem-
plated in) his divine «Dignities» (or personal, convertible and essential attributes). 
The above-described processes all constitute, indeed, the very underpinnings and aims 
of the Art as viewed through a contemplative lens (p. 61; 78). Rubio then proceeds 
to show how Figure S of Llull’s first Art, the Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem 
(c. 1274), a figure which sets out the combined acts of the human intellective soul (the 
Augustinian memory, intellect and will), like the other figures therein, has to be put 
into practice, which practice consists in the application thereof to the combinations 
of the principles from the other figures (chiefly, Figure A assisted by Figure T) (p. 83), 
from which process result certain «Conditions». These conditions consist in a kind 
of hermeneutic analysis of the significations arising from the principles as combined 
within the so-called «Second Figures» (p. 83-84) and themselves serve demonstrative 
purposes (p. 84). 
Rubio then goes on to carry out an ingenious retrospective application of the 
mechanisms of the Art to a passage from Ch. 234 of LC, an application whereby 
such mechanisms are found already to be present in the earlier text, and thus he ably 
illustrates the fully «precursive» nature of LC itself with respect to the Art (p. 84, n. 1), 
revealing likewise how certain crucial conditions derive therefrom too.4 In comparison 
to LC, the Art «proper», in Rubio’s view, involves the additional elements of a fully 
combinatorial procedure which lends thereto a supplementary organicism (p. 84, n. 
1). The latter point, in fact, offers a way out from the aforementioned circularity.
Rubio’s book reveals both a deep and broad familiarity with his primary sources 
and with secondary such. It is worth noting that, while at times drawing upon the 
work of recent scholars, Rubio is nevertheless able to carve out his own distinctive 
channel as regards not only the classifications and periodisations commonly assig-
4. Ramon Llull, LC, Ch. 234, § 19, ORL V, p. 78.
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ned to the Lullian oeuvre (cf. p. 97) but also the overall construal of that oeuvre on 
the part of noteworthy authors, thereby presenting deeply original insights (passim). 
In many ways, Rubio’s book strikes the measured tone of one seeking independently to 
give voice to certain previously underacknowledged or less fêted aspects of a marginal 
and, by virtue of his marginality, original and interesting medieval writer (p. 13-14). 
Rubio’s quest to present a fresh, well-considered and holistic view of Llull’s textual 
production leads as much towards innovative and acutely reasoned proposals (passim) 
as it does to arguments, tactfully expressed, which apply a broader perspective towards 
contemporary disagreements between scholars (e.g. p. 13, n. 1); the ready incorporation 
of helpful materials and acknowledgements of priority (e.g. p. 46; 120-22); attesta-
tion to and significant revision of well-established viewpoints (e.g. p. 54-55; 91-92); 
not to mention the endorsement of what have come to be commonplaces of Lullian 
scholarship (p. 56).5 Thus, for example, we find that Rubio consistently stresses the 
practical and missionary concerns of Llull over any speculative such (particularly as 
regards grammar as a subject of the trivium and its subsumption under —or «transla-
tion into»— the terms and principles of the Art, the analogy drawn by Llull between 
language learning and the acquisition of the Art and Rubio’s own reading of the Art 
as a kind of «Übergrammar» constituting in itself an «alternative language» (p. 44-
45; 115-116; 120-123)). Notably, both Charles Lohr and Anthony Bonner have already, 
in different ways, stressed the practical and pragmatic nature of Llull’s writerly and 
existential endeavours. The link posited more recently by Josep Maria Ruiz Simon 
between inventio and demonstratio, moreover, becomes broader and more forceful still 
in Rubio’s hands, assuming as it does the form of an equation between contemplatio 
itself and demonstratio, an equation wherein contemplatio —guided by (recta) intentio, 
namely, the injunction to love the good and hate what is evil— in turn forms the very 
basis of inventio, and thus serves epistemological ends (p. 98-100).
Rubio also significantly challenges the received wisdom according to which 
Llull introduced the use of letter symbolism or alphabetical notation for combinatoric 
purposes, arguing that, in effect, he did so to facilitate the comprehensibility of his 
texts and thus to lend speed to the reading thereof while eliminating the possibility 
of error and ambiguity (p. 31-33). Rubio supports this claim by pointing to the fact 
that the chapters of LC wherein Llull first introduces this alphabetisation is, in fact, 
5. In this latter instance, the view that, instead of elemental analogies being attributed upwardly to 
God, in the Ternary Phase of Llull’s Art the elemental analogies disappear and the focus is upon a downward 
ternary deployment of divine similitudes or likenesses in creation: in other words, a metaphysical, rather than 
analogical, process occurs.
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in no way concerned with the combination of letters/concepts (p. 32-33). On the ba-
sis that Llull’s Art, being a common, rational method containing common elements 
(i.e. the contents of faith and the principles and conditions of the Arts) adopted by 
agreement, nevertheless requires an additional element to ensure its communicability, 
namely, a common language (p. 20; 22-23), Rubio argues that alphabetisation of this 
kind satisfies both such desiderata (p. 34). 
The paradigm case of the perfect communication of intellectual significations, 
the ideal here being «un échange de signifiés intellectuels au delà des obstacles posés 
par les dictions verbales», is customarily unavailable to humans, bound as they are, 
especially in apologetic terms, to resort to a descent to the sensory nature of language 
(p. 31), a condition which likewise obtains in the case of the «sensible figures» repre-
sented by alphabetical notation (p. 32ff.). Such perfect intellectual communication, 
however, is maximally available to the spiritual beings that are angels in the form of 
a locutio angelorum (p. 35). In my view, however, Rubio’s characterisation of the fore-
going as taking concrete form within Llull’s conceptualisation of the close relations 
between language and reason and as «une sorte d’affinage du moyen sensible» (p. 35), 
perhaps does not go far enough in emphasising the exemplary role of angelic (internal) 
discourse in terms of its providing the model for human internal discourse, itself both 
a key component of Lullian cogitació (see above) —and, hence, contemplation— and 
a modality of supra-sensible communication given the ordinatio ad alterum of the 
contents (i.e. concepts) of the latter discourse.6
 Furthermore, in the context of pressing home the point, central to this book, 
that divine contemplation is an intrinsic part of the Art insofar as it consists in the 
application of the soul’s powers to the divine Dignities, Rubio notes in Llull a further 
equation between contemplation itself and prayer (p. 109), an argument I would 
wholly endorse and an equivalence upon which Llull at all times insists, particularly, 
as Rubio shows, in the final distinction (Chs 315-365) of LC, wholly devoted, as it is, 
to prayer. On the evidence of Rubio’s discussion, given that this particular section of 
LC most greatly resembles the future Art in terms of its use of alphabetical notation 
within the text (p. 110), one could say that there exists a transitive equivalence relation 
between the Art and prayer, namely, that if the Art is equivalent to contemplation and 
contemplation is equivalent to prayer, then the Art itself is equivalent to (a kind of ) 
6. I call cogitació «suprasensible» insofar as, being one of Llull’s spiritual senses, it enjoys great proxi-
mity to and affinity with the intellect; cf. Robert D. Hughes, «Oratio, Verbum, Sermo and «Les paraules de sa 
pensa»: Internal Discourse in Ramon Llull (1271/1272-1290), its Sources, Implications and Applications», Studia 
Lulliana 57, 2017, p. 3-61.
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prayer, a point I myself have been seeking to make in my own work. Moreover, the 
fact of such alphabetical notation’s initial appearance in (Ch. 328 of ) this text might 
also suggest that its introduction in certain ways responds to the exigencies of Lullian 
prayer itself.7 Here also, Rubio’s emphasis on the fact that the moral rectitude of the 
Artist is essential to the discovery of truth (p. 110), along with his functional identi-
fication of the Lullian «first intention» (i.e. to know, love, honour and praise God) 
with contemplation per se, enables him to present forceful arguments (pace certain 
commentators) to the effect that Llull’s method does not progress towards one that 
is purely logical at the expense of its contemplative dimensions (p. 111).
Throughout this work Rubio consistently draws helpful comparisons between 
Lullian thought and practice with those of his scholastic (and Arabic) contemporaries 
and forerunners. Two notable examples of the foregoing occur with respect to the 
writings of St Thomas Aquinas.8 Given that the arguments of both Aquinas and Llull 
support the same conclusions, such comparisons are, of course, instructive in terms 
of the contrasts they provide. In the first such instance, the extreme concision and 
compendiousness of Llull’s response to the question of monopsychism differs greatly 
from Aquinas’s own lengthy and exhaustive treatment of the same topic by recourse 
to authorities (p. 109). In the second, we see Llull abstract the demonstration of the 
unmoved first mover from its context of proving God’s existence (pace Aquinas), for 
the purpose of showing that philosophical discourse itself—and indeed the discourse 
of any science whatsoever—can be reduced to (or «translated into» the terms of ) his 
Art and that the latter is, in fact, capable of bearing the same demonstrative weight 
as the former, claims which Rubio then goes on to show how Llull fulfils (p. 126-28).9 
Along with many other commendable features of this book, comparisons such 
as these, moreover, also serve the broader purpose of drawing in a more general rea-
dership to the extensive Lullian corpus beyond that of specialists already in the field.10 
7. The same transitive equivalence relation exists between the aforementioned contemplatio—inventio—
demonstratio triad, which fact itself might serve to reinforce arguments in support of the truth value Llull, at 
least, attaches to prayer and, hence, point towards the latter’s demonstrativity.
8. Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra averroistas (1270) and Summa contra gentiles (1259-65), respectively. 
9. The first Lullian example is taken from his AD, ROL XXXII, p. 173-74. For Rubio’s analysis of Llull’s 
solution to this question, see the book under review, p. 105-108; the second example occurs in the Introd AD, 
MOG III, ii, p. 33 (p. 87), for analysis of which, see the book under review, p. 125ff.
10. The apologetic aims of the Lullian corpus in general, that is to say, of non-Artistic works as well, 
have been emphasised by Rubio since the time of his earliest writings on Llull, where he observes the presence of 
such aims even in the case of LC, a work which, he states, is addressed to a non-believing or doubting readership, 
despite the continual contemplation of the divinity therein, cf. Josep Enric Rubio Albarracín, Literatura i doctrina 
al Llibre de contemplació de Ramon Llull. (Estudi formal i de continguts del primer volum), «Col·lecció Saviesa 
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This book, therefore, is to be recommended not only to students and scholars alike of 
Ramon Llull, but also to those interested in viewing the centrifugal force with which 
this Catalan medieval author extends the application of concepts from scholastic debates 
concerning the philosophy of language to the realms of medieval understandings of 
semiotics, epistemology and both internal and inter-religious Christian apologetics. 
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Cristiana, 2», València, Editorial Saó, 1995, p. 31, 145. In the book here under review, moreover, he reiterates this 
point with regard to even the very details of a work of the Art such as AD and, by implication, to subsequent 
versions of the Art as well (p. 108).
